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In Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, Susan Hurley defends a reason-responsive account of 
responsibility, argues that appeals to responsibility cannot provide a justification or non-trivial 
specification of brute luck egalitarian theories of justice, and sketches her own cognitive-bias-
neutralizing theory of justice. Throughout, Hurley is concerned with normative (as opposed to 
causal) responsibility, where this is understood as that which licenses (moral or prudential) 
praise, blame, and other reactive attitudes and which implies at least partial (substantive) moral 
accountability in principle for choices and their results. I shall focus on her arguments about the 
role of responsibility in brute luck egalitarian theories of justice. 
 
1. Responsibility and Brute Luck 
Old-fashioned egalitarianism required that outcome advantage be equalized, but this left no room 
for agents being accountable for their choices. A leading form of modern egalitarianism—brute 
luck egalitarianism—avoids this problem by holding instead that only brute luck advantage 
needs to be equalized. One of the important insights of Hurley’s book is that we need to be much 
clearer on the connections between normative responsibility (e.g., as requiring ability to do 
otherwise or as reason-responsiveness) and accountability/responsibility in the theory of justice. 
In particular, we need to distinguish between thick brute luck for an agent—understood roughly 
as a substantive account of what luck is for an agent—and thin brute luck for an agent—
understood simply as the extent to which the agent is not normatively responsible for the 
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outcome. Hurley argues that there is no independent body of evidence (or intuition) about what 
luck (of a sort relevant to brute luck egalitarianism) really is (independently of issues of 
responsibility), and that the debate about the correct account of brute luck should be explicitly 
focused on normative responsibility (the complement of thin brute luck). Brute luck 
egalitarians—myself included—have tended to assume implicitly that the correct account of 
normative responsibility is one based on something like the ability to influence deliberately, and 
have tended to define brute luck in these terms. Hurley very rightly insists that this is a mistake. 
Brute luck egalitarianism should be formulated in terms of thin brute luck, and then debates in 
the theory of normative responsibility will settle what the correct account is of thin brute luck. 
 It’s worth noting, however, that brute luck egalitarianism requires a much richer theory of 
the grounds of normative responsibility than has been systematically developed. Standard 
theories of normative responsibility (e.g., involving the ability to do otherwise or reason-
responsiveness) tell us whether an agent is responsible for her choices, but they do not (I believe) 
give us a full account of when agents are responsible for the outcomes of their choices. For 
example, consider two agents, each of who chooses to smoke in a reason-responsive manner in 
full knowledge that he/she has the ability do otherwise. Each is responsible for his/her choice. 
Suppose further that, unbeknownst to each of them, one agent has genes that make her immune 
to lung cancer and the other has genes that make him highly susceptible to lung cancer if he 
smokes. No plausible brute luck egalitarian view of justice will make each fully responsible for 
the results of his/her (responsible) choices. Any plausible egalitarian theory will view the cancer 
as partly (but not fully) a matter of comparative bad brute luck and provide some compensation 
for its effects.1 
The point here is that a full theory of normative responsibility for one’s choices need not 
be a full theory of normative responsibility for the outcomes of one’s choices, and the latter is 
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needed for brute luck egalitarianism. As far as I know, few, if any, of the standard theories of 
responsibility provide a full theory of responsibility for outcomes. This is not a criticism of 
Hurley’s work. It is merely the identification of an important project. 
 In what follows, then, we’ll assume that brute luck is understood in the thin sense and 
that a full account of responsibility for outcomes has been given. 
 
2. The Specification and Justification of Egalitarianism 
Hurley’s main claim in the middle part of the book is that appeals to responsibility provide 
neither the basis for the specification of an egalitarian distributional pattern nor the basis for a 
justification of such a pattern. Although her claim is correct, and her analysis enlightening, it 
does nothing to undermine the egalitarian enterprise. 
 Hurley’s point of departure for this topic is G.A. Cohen’s claim that “a large part of the 
fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the influence of brute luck on distribution” of 
advantage.2 Hurley argues that this aim cannot justify the egalitarian pattern, since it’s just a 
statement thereof. This is correct, but no one, I think, ever thought otherwise. Cohen, for 
example, is simply attempting to give a formulation of egalitarianism that makes room for 
personal accountability.  
 Hurley acknowledges that appeals to responsibility may have a role in specifying the 
currency of justice (what to distribute). More specifically, they can play a goods-filtering role in 
this specification. Thus, for example, if wellbeing is taken to be a good that presumptively 
matters for justice, appeals to responsibility may establish that it is only wellbeing from brute 
luck (non-responsible) sources that ultimately matters. Hurley rightly insists that this leaves open 
what pattern justice requires with respect to such filtered goods (e.g., equality, in proportion to 
desert, etc.). 
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 Hurley further argues that the aim to “extinguish the influence of brute luck on 
distribution” of advantage does not specify in any interesting sense the egalitarian pattern. She 
argues that there is a luck neutralizer’s dilemma: On the one hand, if brute luck is understood 
counterfactually (e.g., compared to how one might have fared), then the quoted aim does not 
specify the egalitarian pattern. This is because there is no reason to suppose that individuals 
would be responsible for equal amounts of the relevant goods if each person’s (intrapersonal) 
brute luck were neutralized. On the other hand, if brute luck is understood comparatively (how 
one fares compare to others), then neutralization of brute luck trivially specifies an egalitarian 
pattern. 
 I fully agree that the counterfactual reading is unpromising, and that the comparative 
reading trivially specifies the egalitarian pattern. This, however, is as it should be. Brute luck 
egalitarianism cannot be derived solely from claims about responsibility. As Hurley correctly 
notes, responsibility is simply a filter on the presumptive goods (e.g., wellbeing) for the 
specification of the currency of justice. The specification of the egalitarian pattern requires an 
additional assumption (which is what Hurley calls “equality default view”). Hurley agrees with 
this, but views it as problematic. This is because she interprets G.A. Cohen’s claim that “a large 
part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the influence of brute luck on 
distribution” of advantage as a claim that one can obtain a non-trivial derivation of egalitarianism 
from the notion of neutralizing (counterfactual) brute luck. I doubt very much that Cohen—or 
any other brute luck egalitarian—ever intended such a claim. The core egalitarian aim is to 
extinguish (or neutralize) the differential impact of brute luck on advantage. As Hurley 
recognizes, neutralizing the differential impact of brute luck just is the equalization of the impact 
thereof. This does not provide a justification of brute luck egalitarianism, but it does provide an 
important and clear statement thereof. That, I believe, is all that brute luck egalitarians ever 
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intended. 
 
3. Responsibility and Incentives 
The final topic that I shall address concerns the compatibility of the neutralization of differential 
brute luck with incentive rewards. G.A. Cohen has argued against the claim that giving 
incentives to the talented to work harder can be justified on the ground that it is necessary to 
improve the situation of the worst off members of society.3 After all, the more talented could 
choose to work hard without the incentive benefit. Hurley raises the following objection to 
Cohen’s argument. If people are entitled to their option luck (outcomes that are suitably 
attributed to their choices), then they are entitled to at least some of the benefits they produce by 
working harder. Thus, it seems that brute luck egalitarians are committed to giving some extra 
benefits to the more talented to who work harder. 
 If individuals are entitled to their option luck benefits, and individuals reasonably expect 
differential benefits for additional labor, then it does indeed follow that they are entitled to those 
differentials. This, however, is compatible with Cohen’s argument against incentives for the 
talented. First, in many circumstances, maximal feasible brute luck equality can be achieved by 
imposing lump sum transfers (taxes and subsidies) and then leaving in place the results of 
people’s choices (e.g., no income taxes). Cohen’s argument is against the view that the more 
talented should be allowed to have a greater share of the relevant equalisandum on incentive 
grounds. In the context of Rawls’ theory—which is Cohen’s initial target—this includes income 
(as one of the social primary goods), but Rawls’ theory has no commitment to the principle that 
individuals are fully entitled to their option luck. In the context of Cohen’s own egalitarian 
theory, there is a commitment to the entitlement to option luck advantage, but (labor) income is 
not a necessary constituent of the equalisandum (brute luck advantage). Brute luck egalitarian 
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lump sum taxation respects the entitlement to option luck but does not leave the more talented 
with a greater share of brute luck advantage. 
 This does not, however, affect Hurley’s more general point that there is a tension between 
a standard conception of the entitlement to option luck and the role that beliefs about rewards can 
play. Hurley carefully discusses the incentive role that beliefs about responsibility (even if false) 
can play, but I shall here discuss a related issue that Hurley does not explicitly discuss. The 
standard conception of option luck advantage is roughly that of net advantage that one would 
reap in the absence of any social transfers, adjusted by (1) lump sum transfers to equalize brute 
luck advantage, and (2) choice-based transfers to internalize negative externalities (and perhaps 
also positive externalities). This is best called natural option luck, since it takes that natural 
payoff for choices (in the absence of any transfers) as given, and adjusts only as required by the 
above two considerations. Given, for example, the administrative costs of tracking externalities, 
under some circumstances, it may be more efficient to adopt a policy that does not ensure that 
individuals bear the full natural costs of their choices. For example, instead of taxing individuals 
for the exact negative impact on others of their second-hand smoke, we may simply tax the 
purchase of cigarettes, even though some purchasers impose more second-hand smoke than 
others. Thus, there can be a tension between the entitlement to natural option luck and 
efficiency. Given that the gains of efficiency can typically be used to help the worst off, there 
can thus be a tension between the natural option luck entitlement and the providing the greatest 
benefits possible to the worst off. 
 Cohen—like most brute luck egalitarians—appears to be committed to the entitlement to 
natural option luck, but this principle should, I believe, be rejected. Indeed, Hurley’s insistence 
that brute luck is best understood as the absence of normative responsibility helps us see this. 
Any plausible theory of responsibility for outcomes will make it relative to the agent’s 
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reasonable expectations about outcomes. Agents are not normatively responsible for outcomes 
they could not reasonably have anticipated. (The lack of reasonable expectations ensures, for 
example, that the outcome is not reflective of their judgement-sensitive attitudes.) Natural option 
luck as defined above is not suitably sensitive to reasonable expectations, and thus not the 
complement of thin brute luck. For example, in a society in which individuals fully expect their 
income to be taxed at 70%, it would be a matter of thin brute luck (because totally unexpected) if 
the tax were not collected and instead individuals were given their “natural” option luck benefits. 
More generally, as long as the policy of 70% income taxation is suitably public and proactive (so 
that all agents reasonably expect it to be implemented), there is no conflict between it and the 
entitlement to thin option luck. Agents reap the differential rewards of their choices that they 
reasonably expect to reap. 
 Thus, I agree with Hurley that there is a tension between the commitment to entitlement 
to “natural” option luck and efficiency considerations. The tension disappears, however, if the 
entitlement is only to thin option luck (which will be expectation-relative). Brute luck 
egalitarians should therefore give up the appeal to “natural” option luck.4 
 
4. Conclusion 
Hurley insightfully analyzes the role of responsibility in brute luck egalitarian theories of justice. 
First, she rightly insists that brute luck should be understood in the thin sense of absence of 
normative responsibility. The correct account of responsibility will thus tell us what brute luck 
is—rather than there being an independent (thick) account. I have suggested, however, that the 
extant standard theories of responsibility are not currently up to this task. They tell us when an 
agent is responsible for her choices, but they do not determine the extent to which she is 
responsible for the foreseeable effects of those choices (since those effects depend in part on 
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factors for which she is not responsible). Second, Hurley also rightly argues that the 
neutralization of brute luck provides neither a justification nor a specification of an egalitarian 
theory of justice. I have suggested, however, that the neutralization of differential brute luck 
advantage does, in conjunction with the relevant specification of advantage, provide a 
specification, and that this is all such a claim could be hoped to do. Finally, I have agreed with 
Hurley that there is a tension between the entitlement to “natural” option luck and efficiency in 
promoting the benefits for the worst off. This conflict, however, disappears once option luck is 
understood in the thin sense of normative responsibility. Thin option luck is sensitive to 
reasonable expectations and thus leaves room for shaping those expectations to include incentive 
rewards for labor.5 
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